Abstract. While U.S. counterterrorism has improved in many respects since the attacks of September 11 2001, there have still been turf battles and many cases of inadequate coordination between security agencies, which have had damaging effects on intelligence work and operations against terrorist groups. Why, more than fourteen years after 9/11, do U.S. inter-agency operations still break down in this manner? By comparing the United States with the United Kingdom, this article provides a new explanation for the deficiencies in the American response. It shows how U.S. inter-agency conflict has negative operational consequences and draws a contrast with the British security agencies, which tend to be more closely integrated and refrain from engaging in major turf battles. I argue that the differences between the cases stem from a combination of distinct institutions and different organizational routines in the U.S. and U.K. In the United States, divided national institutions and the informal routines of its security agencies have proved problematic for joint operations and intelligence work. The article also critiques some influential existing accounts of U.S. interagency counterterrorism, which emphasize bureaucratic politics or organizational culture, and shows how such perspectives can produce unrealistic policy recommendations. A focus on the deep-seated routines and institutions of the United States leads one to be more sceptical about the prospects for meaningful organizational reform.
intrinsic feature of the national security landscape. 8 But is this always the case? Are significant levels of inter-agency conflict really inevitable in the field of security? This article suggests that the answer is no. In some countries, such as the United States, we do indeed see agencies behaving as models of bureaucratic politics would expect. In other cases, such as the United Kingdom, however, there is a far lower degree of inter-agency conflict and a higher degree of coordination. We cannot account for this variation, I argue, without reference to institutions and routines. As fundamental features that appear in a variety of national settings, state institutions and organizational routines are analytically prior to bureaucratic politics, which appear in some cases but are largely absent from others.
This article adds a comparative perspective to the ongoing scholarly and policy debate on the organization of the United States' response to terrorism. 9 To my knowledge, this is the first study to compare the causes and consequences of the U.S. counterterrorist system with that of another western democracy. 10 The comparative method can offer additional analytical leverage, enabling one to better identify the precise conditions that have led to different outcomes across the cases.
It is crucial for any national response to terrorism to have an effective coordination of operations carried out by the various security agencies involved in the mission. Indeed, a series of terrorist attacks carried out in 2015 and 2016 highlighted how the coordination of counterterrorism is a salient issue not only in the United States but also in France, Belgium and many other countries. "Coordination" here refers to the process of organizing people or groups so that they work in a mutually supportive way towards a common goal. for an effective operational approach to preventing terrorist attacks, the others being: precise and actionable intelligence; a robust but discriminate use of force; and international cooperation. 12 Inter-service coordination is important for putting together pieces of information, which may be dispersed across the nation's security agencies, in order to develop accurate intelligence on the overall threat and particular plots facing the country. Without effective coordination, there is also an increased risk that one agency's actions may compromise the intelligence, military, or arrest operations of another agency. 13 Finally, as
Bruce Hoffman argues, counterterrorism strategy can only work if it utilizes in a coherent way all the elements of national power against the challenge at hand. "Success," he writes, "will ultimately depend on how effectively the U.S. can build bridges within our own governmental structure and…improve the ability to prioritize and synchronize inter-agency operations."
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Full coordination may not be appropriate in every context. Public policy scholars such as Aaron Wildavsky and intelligence experts such as Gregory Treverton point out that duplication and redundancy may increase reliability and bring different perspectives to bear on a problem. Yet, as Treverton also points out, the kind of duplication that we observe in the U.S. case is not always this purposeful and is often wasteful and counter-productive instead. . 13 For example, an arrest operation by one service could halt the efforts of another to build a full intelligence picture of a terrorist network; or two agencies could both try to introduce informants into the same group, bringing a higher risk of raising suspicion. 14 population and do their utmost not to reveal their plans to others. Consequently, there are, as
Paul Pillar puts it, some "permanent and ineradicable" limits on the ability of intelligence and security agencies to prevent attacks. 16 Good coordination is important for averting some of the more avoidable errors committed by security agencies and increasing their ability to prevent terrorism. But even the best organized security response will never be able to stop all attacks.
This article examines domestic intelligence and law enforcement agencies with responsibility for combating terrorism on the national territory. There are two main reasons for this focus. Firstly, as Erik Dahl's research has shown, domestic intelligence and law enforcement activities are key to preventing terrorist attacks against America. 17 Consider also the nature of the threat. Britain has faced a significant degree of 'homegrown' terrorism since 2003-04. 18 In more recent years, U.S. citizens and residents have played an increasingly prominent role in Islamist terrorist plots against the United States. 19 Responding to this evolution of the threat, the U.S. government has emphasized how the latest iteration of its counterterrorism strategy is the first one to "designate the homeland as a primary area of emphasis in our counterterrorism efforts." 20 While it was the domestic/foreign dividing line between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that stymied efforts to uncover the 9/11 plot, the dividing lines between domestic agencies are of crucial importance in the current context. Given that most Islamist terrorist plots against the U.S. and the U.K. are being substantially prepared inside their respective homelands, 21 it 16 Paul Pillar, "Intelligence," in Audry Kurth Cronin and James Ludes, eds. The United States' national security bureaucracy is much larger than that of Britain.
However, any argument that size explains the two countries' records on inter-agency coordination does not hold up, especially if we expand our comparative frame of reference.
Studies have shown how -similar to the United States -the coordination of inter-agency operations has been problematic in two other prominent cases: France and Germany. 25 Yet both of these countries have national security bureaucracies of a comparable size to Britainnot to the U.S. If size was a key factor, we should not observe similar outcomes in America, 22 The distinction between domestic-and foreign-focused agencies is not absolute. While the FBI's main focus is domestic, it is also very active overseas. The CIA concentrates mainly on foreign intelligence, but it also conducts a range of domestic activities. 23 While the main objective of this article is to shed new light on a national security problem, the analysis also has broader theoretical implications. This is because the counterterrorist policy field can be seen as a hard test for institutional and organizational routine theories, particularly for their claim that historical legacies shape current policy in ways that reduce the likelihood of efficient outcomes. One might have assumed that such inefficiencies would have been stamped out more than fourteen years after 9/11 -given that the protection of citizens from Islamist terrorism is one of the highest priorities of the U.S.
government. This has not been the case, however. Since a focus on institutional legacies and organizational routines explains much about how government performs, not just on low-level issues, but also in this top priority area of policy, I argue that the theories have passed a difficult test.
The article proceeds in five steps. The first section critiques both bureaucratic politics explanations of security agency behaviour and a second widely used approach -that of organizational culture. I outline my alternative analysis in the next two sections, which discuss in turn the role of national institutions and the influence of organizational routines in the field of security. These two sections are structured similarly, each beginning with a theoretical discussion, followed by an outline of the relevant institutions or routines in the U.S. and British cases respectively. It is the interaction of these two factors, I argue, that best explains the performance of the two countries on the development of inter-agency intelligence and operations against Islamist terrorism. Evidence is presented for this argument in the case of the United States in the fourth section and Britain in the fifth section. The conclusion presents the implications of these findings for theory and practice, arguing that an emphasis on institutions and routines offers not only a new explanation but also provides a realistic framework for analyzing the viability of proposals for national security 'reform' in the United
States. The article draws on a range of sources, including author interviews with thirty-four current and former counterterrorist officials in the U.S. and the U.K.
Beyond bureaucratic politics and organizational culture
When asked to account for organizational problems in field of national security, analysts often refer to either the bureaucratic politics of security agencies or to negative cultural characteristics of these agencies. of the main "cultural pathologies" identified is a "debilitating sense of agency parochialism,"
according to which CIA personnel developed a strong sense of loyalty to their home agency, rather than to the intelligence community as a whole. Zegart argues that this parochial culture partly explains why some CIA officials avoided sharing information with other agencies prior to 9/11. In other words, inward-looking behaviour is said to stem from an inward-looking or parochial "culture". This explanation conflates the dependent and independent variables.
Similarly, "resistance to change" is identified as a characteristic of CIA culture and used to 30 
How national institutions affect security agencies
The next two sections will trace the relationship between the "macro" institutions of the nation state and the "micro" organizational processes of security agencies. I draw on the "institutionalist" literature, which argues that, at the very least, institutions can be understood to comprise formal rules and procedures, such as "the rules of a constitutional order" and "the standard operating procedures of bureaucracy." 35 One strand of the literature -sociological institutionalism -stresses how these rules and procedures are underpinned by legitimising ideas or norms. 36 For example, as will be outlined below, the rules and procedures of the U.S.
constitution concerning the separation of powers cannot be considered in isolation from the how the presence of a strong legislature, independent of the executive branch, means that the design and reform of national security agencies is subject to messy political compromises. 42 Second, as a federal union, the United States has multiple levels of government -national, state and local -which reflect the political importance of the states as well as a long-standing determination to forestall the development of an excessively powerful central government. 43 While the U.S. has a national investigations bureau -the FBI -it does not have a national police force partly because of fears that this would represent an excessive concentration of coercive power on the domestic scene. 44 This power is decentralized rather to state and local governments, which have their own police departments. Apart from constitutionally-ordained diffusions of power, a third key factor is the tendency towards fragmentation even within the national executive branch. Responsibility for dealing with terrorism is widely distributed across the federal government to agencies such as the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Defense (DOD). 45 Indeed, there is a general tendency towards the proliferation of executive branch agencies in the field of security, whether it is 
Britain's centralized institutions
Britain has a more centralized set of institutions than the United States, organized around a powerful executive branch, which is usually supported by its majority in Parliament. 47 the Home Office, and there is little evidence in the British government of the kind of fragmentation that one observes in the American executive branch.
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In the context of its more centralized institutions, Britain differs from the United
States along three key dimensions. The number of agencies with important roles in the British domestic response to terrorism is lower than in the United States, while authority over counterterrorism in the U.K. has been concentrated in central government. Thirdly, in the context of a generally acquiescent legislature (unlike the assertive American Congress), the parliamentary majority tends to follow the government's lead on security issues, avoiding the need for the sorts of political compromises that have led to overlapping agency jurisdictions in the U.S. We shall return to these three features of U.K. counterterrorism in the next section.
The organizational routines of security agencies
National institutions help to form the structures and routines of counterterrorist agencies. Yet these organizational routines also take on a significance and a momentum of their own, which has a major impact on the quality of inter-agency responses to terrorism. For James March, organizational action stems less from a logic of consequences (the considered weighing of alternatives, envisaged by rational choice theory) and more from a logic of appropriateness.
This means that organizations tend to resort to pre-existing repertoires of action when they recognise a situation "as being of a familiar, frequently encountered, type." 50 Where organizational responses are marked by the appearance of such recurrent patterns of action,
March considers them to be instances of "routinized" activity. are commonly defined as "recurrent interaction patterns" between multiple actors within and across organizations.
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Similar to national institutions, organizational routines tend to develop in a path dependent manner. Markus Becker emphasizes that while routines can change in response to challenges in the external environment, choices made in the past also have "feedback effects"
which favour the continuation of certain routines and make the development of others less viable. 53 Actors also tend to reproduce organizational routines in habitual and unreflective ways. 54 Such routines are all the more powerful because they are not up for debate and are taken for granted in their particular contexts. It is through these path-dependent and habitbased mechanisms that historically-grounded routines shape organizations' responses to contemporary challenges.
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Organizational routines are context-specific and may "strongly differ" across cases.
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Considering the routines of counterterrorist agencies in various national settings, the key differences between them may be captured in the concepts of formal and informal organizational routines -two terms that have a specific meaning in the context of this study.
In this article, a formal routine is indicated by the presence of regularized interaction patterns between agencies, based on rules laid down by a central authority. 57 Interpersonal relationships are important in all organizational settings since they facilitate smooth collaboration between individuals on particular tasks. The key distinction, however, is that the quality of interaction between entire agencies is dependent on interpersonal relations in an informal routines setting, whereas in a formal setting the quality of interaction between agencies does not depend on such relationships. In the remainder of this section, I outline how the three structural conditions helped to shape the development of different organizational routines in the American and British cases.
The United States' informal routines
The organization of U.S. domestic counterterrorism is complex and dispersed, with several core agencies playing a central role in the effort. While the FBI has "lead responsibility" for both counterterrorist intelligence and law enforcement, its jurisdiction over these areas You name it, I was out making relationships." In order to work with other agencies, he underlined, "you gotta meet these guys and they gotta trust you… that you'll protect their secrets and that you'll help them as much as you can." 65 Though such efforts usually bore fruit, they also meant that interactions between the agencies often relied on ad hoc negotiations and thus did not follow a regular pattern. As one experienced FBI agent put it:
"A lot of the way in which we work is personality-driven, and so, you could have a Special investigators is formed to make an operational decision on the case. Reflecting the police's lead responsibility for law enforcement, the chair of the ELG is a police officer and it is the police who have the final say on whether, when and how the suspects will be arrested. 73 As we shall see below, the formal routines of the British agencies were reinforced in the years after 9/11.
Explaining levels of inter-agency coordination in the United States
The next two sections will treat of the United States and Britain in turn, tracing how their divergent institutions and organizational routines have shaped the degree of inter-agency cooperation and conflict found in the two cases. In the U.S., significant coordination problems 71 promote the creation of inter-agency fusion centres in states and cities, which perform information-sharing tasks some of which are similar to those conducted at the FBI-led JTTFs. 85 The FBI's level of engagement with these fusion centres varies considerably and only about one-third of the centres are viewed as effective. 86 Asked about the various FBI and DHS-led networks, one FBI counterterrorist agent referred to them as "surreal parallel environments," which were "very cumbersome and tiresome to deal with." 87 A former senior DHS official also acknowledged that these parallel networks "are at times very redundant."
FBI and DHS
There is, he said, "so much room for improvement" in this area. 88 Rather than seeing it as purposeful, officials within the FBI and DHS view the duplication of effort and rivalry between their two agencies as a cumbersome obstacle to their development of terrorism intelligence. In sum, fuzzy jurisdictional boundaries and informal routines between DOD and the FBI contributed to deficiencies in their coordination of intelligence, most notably in the case of Nidal Hasan. Rather than clarifying their respective roles, changes to the law rather threatened to extend this confusion into another domain -the detention of terrorist suspects.
FBI and DOD

FBI and NYPD
After 9/11, the New York Police Department 102 developed a major counterterrorist capability Zazi for a 'random search' but their sniffer dog failed to detect the materials, leaving police without a pretext to open his trunk and so they left him on his way. The fact that the FBI had used the Port Authority rather than NYPD angered the latter and soon the police department was taking its own initiatives on the case. 110 The Intelligence Division began asking their sources about Zazi, including an imam, Ahmad Afzali, who proceeded to inform the suspect by phone that law enforcement were onto him. FBI and NYPD officials have blamed each other both anonymously and publicly in the press for tipping off Zazi. 111 In any case, by this time, he had jettisoned his bomb-making materials and was soon taken in for questioning. As later court cases would show, a significant plot had been foiled but in a haphazard way which cut short efforts to develop intelligence on Zazi's network and allowed any co-conspirators ample opportunity to flee. 112 Indeed FBI officials stated that they would have preferred to monitor Zazi and others for longer to gather further intelligence but could not because of the NYPD intervention. 113 Independent initiatives on both sides and a failure to cooperate on operational decision-making contributed substantially to this suboptimal outcome.
In sum, separate lines of responsibility at federal and state level and the lack of a central authority for counterterrorism gives the NYPD and the FBI freedom to informally implement both general policies and specific operational decisions without consulting each other -a pattern that led to conflict and confusion between the two sides. Such informal organizational routines, which enable rapid and nimble action, can certainly be a strength in counterterrorism. 114 However, when informal routines and relationships are relied upon to various counterterrorist agencies for regular meetings in which they pool their information on terrorism. The centre also produces "all-source" analyses of the threat, which aim to integrate all terrorism-related intelligence possessed by U.S. government departments, agencies and intelligence organizations. 123 NCTC is widely considered to have added value in these areas.
As one senior FBI intelligence official put it: "on threat analysis and information-sharing, I
think they do a pretty good job, and most people here [at the FBI], including the Director, would say that." NCTC has direct access to the databases of the FBI and other agencies, the official explained: "We're not only giving it to them… they can draw it out themselves." 
MI5 and the London Metropolitan Police
During the 1990s, the missions of Britain's three core domestic counterterrorist agencies were shaped by a sharp distinction between intelligence and evidence. MI5 devoted itself to collecting intelligence; the law enforcement officers of the Metropolitan Police Anti-Terrorist Branch (ATB) worked purely on gathering evidence that could be admitted to court; and Metropolitan Police Special Branch straddled the line between the two, linking intelligence to evidence-development. 128 After 9/11, however, facing a perceived threat of mass-casualty terrorism, the ATB police began arresting suspects earlier in the inquiry process than they had in the past (when they had faced the Irish Republican Army). In this context, the AntiTerrorist Branch began to work more intensively with MI5 early on in particular cases to facilitate the assembly of evidence and enable consequent arrests. Senior ATB law enforcement officers, such as Peter Clarke, confirmed that they were now working with MI5
at an earlier stage of inquiries and were being given greater access to sensitive intelligence than they had previously. 129 Special Branch officers were unhappy when they learned that it was to be closed down and its personnel absorbed into a new agency. 133 Nevertheless, no major conflict ensued between Special Branch and the other agencies. Two factors help to explain why.
Firstly, we need to understand how the UK's formal organizational routines -which involve distinct missions for each agency, laid out in government guidelines -have fostered stable expectations among the counterterrorist services. As noted above, these government guidelines have specified since the early 1990s that Special Branch's role was to "assist" MI5's work on terrorism intelligence. In this context, there has been an expectation among Special Branch officers in recent decades that MI5's role in terrorism intelligence would continue to be enhanced -at their expense. 134 As the ultimate outcome of what one senior police officer called a set of "incremental changes," the decision to put an end to Special Branch as a distinct entity was wholly in tune with the established trend. 135 Secondly, the impact of this change was also softened by the overall balance that the UK's reforms maintained between the roles of the intelligence and police agencies. Since 2004, the government has allocated funding to more than double the staff of both MI5 and of the police's main counterterrorism entities. 136 While such expansions may encourage mission grabs in some countries, the core counterterrorist agencies in Britain have less room to take such initiatives because each service has a distinct and well-insulated mandate. MI5 has a clear lead on the intelligence mission while the police maintains responsibility for law enforcement.
Formal organizational routines thus reduce the likelihood that agencies will take rapid or independent initiatives, which can provoke conflict between them and other services, as we have seen in the U.S. case. In Britain, rather, changes were introduced incrementally either by 
MI5 and regional police
While the British agencies foiled several substantial terrorist plots in the post 9/11 era, their 
Implications for Theory and Policy
In Branch. Rather than placing interests at the centre of the analysis, it is more fruitful to examine the jurisdictional boundaries between security agencies (whether they are distinct or overlapping). It is equally important to focus on how informal organizational routines enable individual agencies to take rapid and independent initiatives, which are more likely to cause conflict and stymie cooperation than changes that are introduced incrementally with the support of a central authority.
Routines are sometimes linked to, or seen as a component part of, organizational culture. 145 In this sense, my conclusions build on and are complementary to cultural studies.
Nevertheless, this article has suggested that a focus on organizational routines offers more specific mechanisms than culture for the analyst to examine. It has specified three institutionally-based structural conditions, which shape the formation of these routines. This interaction between national institutions and specific organizations is worthy of further study.
As argued above, since institutional and organizational routine theories can explain how historical legacies lead to sub-optimal practices -even in a top priority area such as counterterrorist policy -these theories have passed a difficult test.
Turning to policy implications, this study identifies certain key conditions for the development of a high level of inter-agency cooperation on counterterrorist intelligence and law enforcement operations. The presence of few core counterterrorist agencies, whose work is regulated by distinct missions and clear guidelines laid down by a central authority, has been found to give rise to formal organizational routines (see Figure 1) . These routines entail regularized interaction between services and favour the development of a relatively high level of cooperation between core organizations. All of the conditions leading to this outcome were present in the British case and absent in the American case. 146 It may be useful for U.S.
policymakers to take these conditions into account when making future alterations to the agencies; for example, the importance of giving distinct missions to security organizations.
Furthermore, the record of NCTC shows how formal routines and coordination mechanisms can be introduced into parts of the system in a way that brings concrete benefits. Some degree of reform to the coordination of U.S. counterterrorism is possible.
However, the analysis offered in this article also highlights the severe constraints on reform and indicates why more substantial changes to the coordination of U.S. In the context of such attitudes, anything that smacks of centralization is likely to face rigorous opposition.
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Even if these obstacles could be overcome and a moderate centralization of U.S. counterterrorism was introduced, my analysis suggests that it would not make a great deal of difference to operational coordination. The informal routines of the U.S. agencies have, over time, taken on significant momentum and staying-power. As noted above, the theoretical literature on the subject indicates that organizational routines are taken for granted in their particular contexts and tend to be reproduced in unreflective ways. Cross-jurisdictional incursions and turf battles have become routine and expected behaviours among U.S. security agencies. It would take more than a moderate increase in central authority to change these deeply-embedded organizational routines. In American politics and society, however, a more than moderate centralization is unlikely to be acceptable.
A second idea for reform is that policies designed to alter the incentive structure of security officials might reduce their focus on their own agency's bureaucratic interest. For example, Amy Zegart has suggested making rotational assignments to other agencies a requirement for promotion. She argues that this would create incentives and opportunities to 148 Interview with a former senior FBI and NCTC official [US-N], Northern Virginia, September 21, 2009. 149 The opposition would be particularly strong against giving the federal government greater power over state and local law enforcement. establish informal networks and build trust between officials across agencies. 150 It is true that good relations between individuals can improve inter-agency cooperation for a certain period, as was outlined in the FBI-NYPD case above. Yet, as this example also showed, such informal links and routines do not provide a sustainable solution to the problems of interagency coordination and conflict over turf.
These and other reform proposals are influenced by the widespread assumption that bureaucratic self-interest is a key driver of deficiencies in inter-agency coordination. Perhaps surprisingly, it turns out that this assumption leads to overly optimistic conclusions. A comparison of the United States with the British case, focused on their deep-seated routines and institutions, leads one to be more doubtful about the prospects for significant change in inter-agency counterterrorism.
When a terrorist attack takes place in the United States, the response of many members of Congress in the weeks and months afterwards is to criticise the security agencies that failed to prevent it. They do not usually acknowledge that the fragmented counterterrorist system that they criticise stems from a deep-rooted set of anti-statist institutions of which Congress itself is a key component. Rather than simply blaming the agencies, lawmakers and citizens would do well to acknowledge more explicitly the uncomfortable trade off between avoiding excessively strong government on the one hand and developing effective interagency counterterrorism on the other.
